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gaze	or:	a	reading	of	Huizinga	with	Lacan	
Steffen	Wittig	
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Abstract 
This article seeks to explore how imaginary objects, such as toys, may become 
something real in such a medium as the “game”. To this end, two assertions are 
made which focus on the question of how things, that are only called imaginary, 
become something invariably real. Firstly, this paper proposes the thesis that ima-
ginary things become real objects, within the “game”, through a certain subjective 
attitude of the player, which Huizinga would denote as 'holy earnest'. Secondly, 
the mode in which an imaginary thing is articulated, for Huizinga, as real in a 
game, the ’holy earnest‘, appears to be very close to Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic 
perspective of how we constitute ourselves through the binding on the ’gaze of the 
other‘. This article concludes with Sartre in the thesis, that the ‘gaze of the Other’ 
articulates us as subjects, only in the form of an objectification, which is always 
imaginary as well. So we perceive ourselves in the objectifying ‘gaze of the Other’ 
only as subjects. 
Keywords: Huizinga, Lacan, Sartre, game, toy, gaze, subjectivation 
If one looks at the way in which the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga articulates 
the term ‘game’, one thing is striking: The game seems to him to be something that 
can hardly be defined. Rather, he sketches forms of negation, in which he tries to 
limit the problem of the game. For him, the game is nothing that can be described 
as a space of relieving oneself of a surplus of life force or as a matrix of calming 
down harmful impulses. It is neither something that could be explained by a con-
genital imitation instinct nor something which would result from the need to relax. 
Finally, for Huizinga it is also not exlusively a practice space, in which abilities that 
are articulated as useful, in a sphere beyond play, can be practiced without conse-
quences (Huizinga 1980, p. 13). For him, something else seems to be important: The 
game can not just be determined by referring to an external purpose to the game. 
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Instead, for Huizinga in the game a "something" (p. 1) is present, which makes it a 
sphere attributing a meaning to itself and the objects dealt within. On the one hand 
this ’something‘ forms itself precisely because the game delimits itself, from an 
area of the seriousness of ordinary life. On the other hand, the constitution of 
meaning, this ‘something’, within the game only becomes possible through taking 
seriously the sphere of unearnestness produced (p. 20 sq.). 
But this constitution of meaning touches spacifically the central things of the 
‘game’: the toys. In the ‘game’, you can pretend that a piece of fabric is a doll, as if 
a doll were another child, as if another child were a mother, father, policeman, and 
so on. In the game, the merely imaginary is articulated as reality and this imagi-
nary reality in part appears "more real than reality", as Gebauer and Wulf (1998, p. 
203) make clear. In the following, I would like to make two assertions that focus on 
the question of how things that are only called imaginary become something that is 
invariably real. In this regard, I would like, firstly, to propose the thesis that imagi-
nary things become real objects within the game through a certain subjective atti-
tude of the player, which Huizinga would denote as 'holy earnest' (1). Secondly, 
the mode in which an imaginary thing is articulated for Huizinga as real in a game 
appears to be very close to Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic perspective of how we 
constitute ourselves through the binding on the ’gaze of the Other‘ (2). Thirdly, I 
will try to conceive the argumentation in a nutshell (3). 
1.	Huizingas	'holy	earnest'	
If we approach the question of how subjects become entangled in imaginary 
phenomena, we encounter the problem of the game. This mode of entanglement 
appears as a transformation of imaginary objects into – for the players within the 
game – real facts. If we follow authors like Caillois or Fink, a specific mode of ‘as-if’ 
not only seems to mark the central mode which characterizes the game and its 
objects. Rather, it demarcates the sphere of the game from a sphere of the earnest of 
ordinary life through the articulation of the imaginary, as real within the game.1 
But both authors come straight to this conclusion by referencing the Dutch histo-
rian Johan Huizinga. He developed a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of the 
game, from which it became clear how imaginary objectivities become real things 
within the game. 
For an examination of the game concept of Huizinga, it is important for us to 
                                                            
1  Huizinga 1980, p. 5, Caillois 1982, p. 14f., Fink 2010b, p. 83f. 
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consider what Huizinga explicitly ascribes an "independent" character to the game 
(Huizinga 1980, p. 6). In it, intellectual and community life are brought into a rela-
tionship, which is unneccessary. "Play would be altogether superfluous" (p.3), it is 
somethng without a function, which one "could equally well leave alone" (p. 8). 
Nevertheless, it does give sense to the practice of the subject (p. 1). But how can we 
understand this simultaneous superfluity and meaningfulness of the ‘game’ as a 
connection? A discussion of Huizinga's "formal characteristics of play" (p.13) al-
lows us to take a closer look at this contradictory constitution of the ‘game’. In this 
regard it is helpful to examine closely Huizinga's attempt to define the ‘game’: 
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity standing 
quite consciously outside "ordinary" life as being "not serious", but at the same time 
absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material 
interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within ist own proper bounda-
ries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It prom tes 
the formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and 
to stress their difference from the common world by disguise or other means. 
(Huizinga 1980, p. 13) 
The relationship between two aspects of this formal characterisation seem cru-
cial to us in pursuing the question of how imaginary things become real in the 
game: a) the as-if-mode, which constitutes the possibility-space of the game and b) 
the irreflective entanglement of the player in this mode of as-if, which Huizinga 
denotes as "holy earnest" (p. 20). 
a) As-if mode: Huizinga sees the game as a space of freedom that is distinct from 
the seriousness of "ordinary life" (Huizinga 1980, p.9). At first sight, the seriousness 
denotes itself as outside of the game. Only the act of voluntary participation in the 
game, as a play action, is considered "not serious" (p.13), and describes a practice 
that draws a difference from the seriousness of ordinary life in the game. Play "is 
rather a stepping out of ’real‘ life into a temporary sphere of activity with a dispo-
sition all of its own." (p. 8) Such a "sphere" (p. 25) is described as a space of the ‘as-
if beyond the seriousness of life’. As Bührmann (2012, p. 46) puts it aptly, it forms 
an "intermediate" in which it is no longer possible to distinguish between serious-
ness and non-seriousness. Exactly this intermediate articulates the possibility-space 
of the game. 
Firstly, such a possibility-space of the ‘as-if’ is characterized by the fact that the 
actions of the player are free "from ethical obligations" (Bührmann, 2012, p. 46). 
The player acting in the game does not have to take any responsibility for his/her 
actions. He/She is largely exempted from the moral criteria of his/her actions with-
in the game: He/She is "only pretending" (Huizinga 1980, p.22). Secondly, that pos-
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sibility-space of the game refers to an area in which things seem possible to the 
player which would be unimaginable within real life. Thirdly, in this space of the 
‘as-if’, things can be made reversible, which are irreversible in the seriousness of 
ordinary life. For example, if a player is sentenced to a jail term in Monopoly, 
he/she may leave prison, if he/she owns a 'get-out-of-jail-free' card. In the serious-
ness of ordinary life, this seems unthinkable. Against this backdrop, the game be-
comes something which is "an unfolding of human life, a space of freedom" 
(Gebauer & Wulf, 1998, p. 191). 
This possibility-space appears particularly interesting in the context of the 
question attributing meaning to something which exists only in the ‘as-if’ mode, 
because of the simultaneous blurring of the boundary between seriousness and 
non-seriousness. The difference between possibility and reality seems suspended, 
or like Huizinga states, "The contrast between play and seriousness is always flu-
id." (Huizinga, 1980, p. 8) 
This is particularly evident in the interaction of the player with the objects of 
the game, the toys. Huizinga gives a concise example: 
[…] play is not ‘ordinary‘‚ or ‘real‘ life. It is rather a stepping out of ‘real‘life into a 
temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own. Every child knows per-
fectly well that he is ‘only pretending‘, or that it was ‘only for fun‘. How deep-seated 
this awareness is in the child's soul is strikingly illustrated by the following story, told 
to me by the father of the boy in question. He found his four-year-old son sitting at the 
front of a row of chairs, playing ‘trains‘. As he hugged him the boy said: ‘Don't kiss the 
engine, Daddy, or the carriages won't think it's real‘ (Huizinga, 1980, p. 8). 
This point of the emergence from ordinary and real life is crucial for Huizinga. 
It is characterized systematically by that what which happens here in relation to 
the boy and his "engine" (Huizinga, 1980, p. 8): An object existing beyond the game 
is imagined, within the game, as something to which a specific meaning is attribu-
ted and seems anything but imaginary. If we follow the statements of Eugen Fink, 
then the toy carries this peculiar ambivalence in itself. It is both "thing in plain real-
ity and at the same time it has another, mysterious, reality"; it has a "magical cha-
racter" (Fink, 2010a, p. 22). So a toy is at the same time a ’plain real’ thing as well as 
more than that. It is as something ‘thing-like’, something which magically trans-
cends empirical reality. The toy in this regard is an ‘in-between’: A thing which is 
both real and imaginary. The crucial question is: In what is this magic founded that 
overcomes this difference of the simultaneity of the real and imaginary, in the toy, 
as a specific object of the game and what makes it a thing that is "more real than 
reality" (Gebauer & Wulf, 1998, p. 203)? 
For Huizinga it is a kind of consciousness, which actually would make it im-
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possible to consider the chairs as a real engine; it is the consciousness to know, that 
these chairs are not an engine. When you consider the case of the playing boy, es-
pecially his statements to his father, in which he expressed that he does not want to 
be hugged, otherwise the carriages would think that the engine is not real, we can 
see that he knows that the imaginary engine is not a real engine. But maybe it is 
precisely this consciousness which is the reason for that magical transformation.  
b) Irreflective entanglement: Vital for this coincidence of imaginary and reality is 
the term of the "holy earnest" (Huizinga, 1980, p. 20): This concept designates a 
specific subjective attitude of consciousness in which, Huizinga says, "ordinary life 
is at a standstill" (p. 21) and in which, following Rodriguez (2006), the limits be-
tween the sphere of the earnest of ordinary life and the sphere of the ‘as-if’ of the 
game are blurring. However, that consciousness, which Huizinga describes here, 
subsists on the simultaneity of knowing about the ‘as-if’ of the game and getting 
lost in it despite – or maybe, we could hypothesise, because – of this knowledge. It 
is the consciousness of something that transcends this consciousness itself: a "par-
tial consciousness of things ‘not being real’ in magic and supernatural phenomena 
generally“ (Huizinga 1980, p. 23). 
This concept of ‘holy earnest‘ is generated from a assumed similarity between 
the game and the cult: Huizinga "characterize[s] ritual as play" (Huizinga 1980, p. 
18). Both are thought in proximity to each other, because both are denoted by a 
certain "attitude" (p.21), which characterizes both – the relation of the player to the 
game and the the relation of the ritual executor to the rite. Both are serious con-
cerning the realization of their practices, whether play or cult. Furthermore, both 
are "more real than reality" (Gebauer & Wulf, 1997, p. 203). For the player they are 
"profoundly" serious (Huizinga, 1980, p.20) and the playing subject can "abandon 
himself body and soul into the game" (p. 21). The player is gripped by the game 
and unable to leave this grip. The seriousness of the actual life seems suspended 
for the player. 
Decisive for this suspension is the "play spirit" (Huizinga, 1980, p.21), in which 
the player plays the game. However, this suspension would be misunderstood, if 
one were to call it an effect of a substantively and sovereignly understood subjec-
tivity. That consciousness can not simply be described as a reflexivity, in which the 
player intentionally distinguishes a realm of seriousness from a realm of non-
seriousness, and then also binds him/herself in a sovereign turn to the imaginary 
context of the game. The boundary between the serious and non-serious would 
then not be suspended. The boy, who does not want his father to hug him in front 
of the carriages, because he does not want the wagons to notice that the locomotive 
INTERMEDIATE	THINGS	6	
is not real, knows that these toy elements of the game just exist in the imaginary 
mode of ‘as-if’. Nevertheless, he takes this well-known ‘as-if’ of the game uncondi-
tionally seriously, without dismissing this as a mere unreality. How can this be 
conceivable for Huizinga? 
That redoubled relationship of the subject, which at the same time is distanced 
and without any distance from the game, seems vital here. The "fever of the game" 
(Bataille, 2001, p. 306) catches the player through the knowledge that it is just a 
game: The boy, who plays the engine, "plays and knows that [he] plays" (Huizinga, 
1980, p. 18). In his knowing attitude, he is entangled in a "paradox of the simulta-
neous indistinguishability and undecidability of non-seriousness and seriousness, 
play and reality" (Pfaller, 2002, p.100), precisely because the distinction between 
seriousness and non-seriousness produces a simultaneous indistinguishability of 
both: Just because the player knows that the game is not serious, he/she still does 
not know whether it is not for others – if it concerns the imagined carriages or any 
other players, onlookers or him/herself as a spectator. Rather, this indeterminate 
‘Other’ is always assumed to be somebody, who potentially believes in the seri-
ousness of the game (Huizinga 1980, p.24). This imputed ‘Other’ enables the player 
to recognize him/herself as someone, who is perceived as playing in the gaze of 
that ‘Other’. The productive spell of the game only unfolds against the background 
of the imputed gaze of the ‘Other’, which entangles the player in an illusion know-
ingly brought to life by the player: "Whether one is sorcerer or sorcerized one is 
always knower and dupe at once"(p. 23). 
This requires a more detailed explanation: Robert Pfaller attempts to sketch 
that figure of the knowing entanglement of the subject in his Illusions of the Others 
under the term 'imagination without owner' (Pfaller 2002, pp. 9 sq.).2 How could 
the phenomenon be explained, that we believe in something, from what we know, 
to be absolutely ’stupid‘or ’idiotic‘? So how could we lose ourselves in a spell, ar-
ticulated by something, which is ”formally accompanied by a better knowledge“ 
(p. 10)? If we follow Pfaller in this regards, we may see he is describing this as an 
imagination, "which is experienced and sustained in the form of a distance" (p. 10). 
It is precisely this better knowledge through which that imagination is instituted in 
a suspended way. Through the knowledge of the non-seriousness of an imaginat-
                                                            
2  Those imaginings without owners are defined by Pfaller as follows: "So we are dealing with imagi-
nings that (1) seem to have no bearers; which (2) are not abolished by better knowledge, but may 
possibly be strengthened first; (3) claiming themselves as strange, held at a distance by knowledge, 
in the form of coercion; their absence (4) often goes unnoticed and (5) therefore seems to have no 
content "(Pfaller 2002, p. 14). 
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ing, this is admittedly identified as non-reality. This non-reality, however, seems to 
depict a possible claim to reality which can be taken seriously. But because it is 
potentially real, it must be regarded as principally possible. Pfallers (2002, p. 25 sq.) 
figure of interpassivity points out: The non-seriousness becomes serious, because 
"it refers to a virtual, not to an actually present public" (p. 37). Practically the belief, 
to which the player 'objectively believes', is articulated as something which is im-
puted to an assumed third in the act of playing itself. The player does not need to 
believe in the seriousness of that context of play. It is the ”belief-in-the-believing-
of-the-Other“ (Bergrande, 2010, p. 109), the believing, that the Other could take 
seriously the non-seriousness, which makes the player believe in the ‘as-if’ mode of 
the game. 
But just because a third is assumed, whose believing in such an ‘as-if’ is impu-
ted, does not mean that the player has to do the same. Rather, as Pfaller works out 
on Huizinga’s Homo Ludens, it is the moment in which the player sees through the 
illusion of the game, as something the Other could unconditionally believe in. This 
disavowing is the phenomenon, in which the player becomes irreflexively entan-
gled in the game, because no differentiation between possibility (someone could 
exist, who takes serious the non-seriousness, e.g. the wagons of the train for the 
playing boy) and reality can be made (Pfaller, 2002, p. 113). This means, however, 
that the player is not "deceived by the game" (p.114), but "just and just then" the 
player is "grasped" by the illusion of the game, insofar as the player sees through 
"the illusion of the game" (p. 115). 
The crucial point here is that "this effect can not occur through confusion" 
(Pfaller, 2002, p. 114) of seriousness and non-seriousness. The opposite is the case: 
"Only if you know that it is 'only' a game, you can be more involved in it than in 
other life", because "whatever the game pretends to be, the players may not fall for 
it – otherwise it's not a game for them anymore" (p. 114). Only at the moment of 
looking through the illusion of the game the gaze of the imputed Other on the 
player is articulated by the player him/herself. In the gaze of the imputed Other (in 
the example of the locomotive-playing boy, the imagined carriages are produced as 
this Other), the player sees her/himself as someone whose play could cast a spell 
over an imputed Other. Žižek gets to the heart of this figure of interpassivity by 
recalling a famous example: 
Let us recall the proverbial crippled adolescent who, unable to compete in basketbal, 
identifies himself with a famous player he watches on the television screen, imagines 
himself in his place, acting 'through' him, getting satisfaction from his triumphs while 
sitting alone at home in front of the screen – examples like this abound in conservative 
cultural criticism, with its complaint that in our era, people, instead of engaging in di-
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rect social activity, prefer to remain impassive consumers (of sex, of sport …), achiev-
ing satisfaction through imaginary identification with the other, their ideal ego, ob-
served on screen. […] I can be active (shining on the basketball court) only in so far as I 
identify with another impassive gaze for which I am doing it, that is, only in so far as I 
transpose on to another the passive experience of being fascinated by what I am doing, 
in so far as I imagine myself appearing to this Other who registers my acts in the sym-
bolic network (Žižek, 2000, p. 116 sq.). 
Vital is that "redoubled gaze" (Žižek, 2000, p. 116): The moment of seeing 
through the illusion of the game, in which the player has the impression that 
he/she knows what he/she is dealing with, makes him/her impute an Other, in 
whose eyes he/she emerges as someone whose actions could fascinate such an 
Other. The player is behelding that an imputed Other, a "virtual observer" (Pfaller 
2002, p. 263 sq.), is watching her/him.  
Indirectly, however, Pfaller points out that Huizinga encounters a decisive li-
mit: If the belief in the seriousness of the non-seriousness of the game is constituted 
precisely by the assumption of a third instance, who really believes in the reality of 
the imaginary, so to say a "belief in the belief of the other", as Bergrande (2010, p. 
109) says, it remains questionable3 how such a binding to an assumed third in-
stance could be conceived. However, a hint at this is provided by the ‘engine’-
example given at the beginning: At the moment the father ’hugs‘ the boy, the illu-
sionary character of the game threatens to be revealed to the assumed third in-
stance. The gaze of the assumed Other is looking at the boy constantly and the boy 
is observing this. But how can this ‘redoubled gaze’ be qualified in detail? 
2.	The	gaze	of	the	Other	
One possible perspective on this is provided by Lacan, above all, with his in-
vestigations into the "gaze as objet petit a" (Lacan 1978, p. 72sq.). That assumed 
third, the Other, seems to be connected to it in a specific way. This gaze of the 
third, however, appears in a manner, that Lacan calls the splitting of eye and gaze. 
I want to refer, in two ways, on this gaze of the third. 
Firstly, this gaze of the assumed third appears as something staring at the mo-
tionless subject. This may be better understood by the so-called Wolfman figure, 
whose case Lacan interprets in Freud's speech. It is the Wolfman's dream that 
makes the Other appear as this motionless staring entity. Freud noted his patient's 
                                                            
3  And this question generally arises in relation to the interpretation of the game from the point of 
view of interpassivity as Žižek and Pfaller make it. see Žižek 1991, p.50sq, 2008, p. 36sq.; Pfaller 
2002, p. 25sq. 
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comments about his dream as follows: 
I dreamt that it was night and that I was lying in bed. (My bed stood with its foot to-
wards the window; in front of the window there was a row of old walnut trees. I know 
it was winter when I had the dream, and night-time.) Suddenly the window opened of 
its own accord, and I was terrified to see that some white wolves were sitting on the 
big walnut tree in front of the window. […] In great terror, evidently of being eaten up 
by the wolves, I screamed and woke up. […] The only action in the dream was the 
opening of the window, because the wolves sat quite calmly without any movement 
on the branches of the tree, to the right and to the left of the trunk, and looked at me.  
(Freud 2000, p. 154) 
What is striking here is that this figure of the gaze of the Other manifests itself 
in the appearance of the wolves. Here the subject is bound by fear of the Other's 
gaze, which occurs through the fear of being eaten by the staring wolves. For La-
can, however, a division of the subject reveals itself at this point: between being 
seen through a foreign gaze, remaining outside of the subject, and its own seeing of 
the subject symbolized by the metaphor of the eye. In his seminar on anxiety, he 
tries to approach that concept of the eye. So he claims:  
the eye, I would go so far as to say, organises the world in space, that it reflects what in 
the mirror is reflection, but which reflection is visible to the most piercing eye, the re-
flection that it itself carries of the world in this eye that it sees in the mirror, that in a 
word there is no need for two opposing mirrors for there to be already created the infi-
nite reflections of the hall of mirrors (Lacan 2016, p. 280).  
Two things become clear at this term of the eye: The seeing of the eye is what, 
on the one hand, opens up the epistemological space of the world. On the other 
hand, however, this space opens up as a reflection of a reflection. This refers to 
something that looks at the seeing of the eye itself: The gaze of the Other. Lacan 
starts from the "preexistence of a gaze" of that Other, which, just because it looks at 
us, first brings to life the possibility of the seeing of the subject (Lacan 1978, p. 78). 
At the same time, however, the gaze of the Other only appears in the seeing of the 
eye: It emerges as a reflection, as an image, in the "pupil" of the seeing eye, and 
thereby enables that the seeing of the eye focuses on this being-seen. Only through 
the opening of the window in the dream of the wolfman, the being-seen by the 
wolves appears; but at the same time the gaze of the wolves appears as the in-
stance during which the dreaming see him/herself as seeing (p. 86).4 
This is particularly clear in the second figure of the third's gaze: Lacan de-
scribes how he, as a young man, often went fishing with other fishermen. One day, 
one of those fishermen, Petit-Jean, "showed him something floating on the waves. 
                                                            
4  For a closer look on the figure of the window cf. Lacan 2016, p. 138 
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It was a [...] sardine can, of all things. So it swam in the sun, as a witness of the 
canning industry, which we should supply: Reflected in the sun. And Petit-Jean 
said: Do you see the can? Do you see it? It, it does not see you!" (Lacan 1978, p. 
101). For Lacan, this raises the question of how this can is able to look at him. Cen-
tral to this is that the can is noticed by the crew, so to say: it catches the eye because 
it reflects the light. In the reflection of the can, however, the scenery of the fisher-
men is nothing but an image. At the core, however, being an image also means: "I 
am being beheld" (p. 113). In Lacan's example, the sign of being seen is the irides-
cence of the can on the sea. Only through this does the seeing bind itself to the 
reflection on the sea. It reflects itself in the reflection of the can in the light. And so 
Lacan sums up: "Through the gaze I step into the light" and this gaze is that of the 
Other, "that is in the outside" (p. 113). The Other´s gaze is something that is com-
pletely external to one's own seeing. But this external gaze, insofar as it is grasped 
under the sign of reflection, initiates the seeing of the subject in such a way that it 
sees itself as seeing itself (cf. p. 90). It is nothing but an image to the external gaze 
of the Other. Lacan tries to limit how that end of the image can be determined by 
trying to delineate it with the metaphor of the artist. "In the image, the artist [...] 
wants to be the subject", i.e. he/she wants to appear "as a gaze". From here Lacan 
derives the thesis: In the image, there is always an eye-catching gaze (p 107).  For 
Lacan, the "function of the picture" simply refers to "the gaze": The artist "deposits" 
his specific artistic perspective, his gaze, in the picture; but, as it were, it produces 
this image in reference to the imputed "gaze of the admirer", the one who enjoys 
seeing this picture. He is literally giving this virtual observer something to see. To 
be an image in this sense means to be the depot of the other's gaze. 
It is precisely this split between eye and gaze that now seems to cast a produc-
tive perspective on the posed problem, how a toy, which is constitutively split 
between an imaginary and real connotation, becomes something more real than 
reality in the game. This seems to become possible through the gaze of the Other 
that separates itself from the eye. This gaze of an imputed third becomes an object, 
namely, as Lacan calls it, an “object petit a”. Lacan views this object as a cut-off 
part of the subject. It "visualizes" the constitutive lack that permeates the subject 
(Lacan, 2016, p. 267). "The gaze," Žižek writes (1991, p. 59) in relation to our ques-
tion, is "the point in the object (in the image) from which the subject is already be-
ing looked at, i.e the object is the one that looks at me". As something separated, 
this gaze focuses on the subject and, as it were, points to this subject as something 
belonging to the subject in the form of a "lack" (p. 59). The toy is an object, too, 
which places a gaze on the player and thus makes him an image. But this image 
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appears to this gaze as just something insufficient. It seems to be this ‘lack’ which 
connects the player to the gaze, from that game’s object. 
But how does this ’lack‘, of a gaze of the Other, appear? To my mind there are 
two possible answers, which both qualify this systematic figure of the Other in a 
particular way, by tracing it back to Lacans theoretical background, from which he 
evolves the figure of the Other. On the one hand, Lacan develops this split between 
the eye and the gaze through his perspective on the œdipal complex and the Other 
as prohibiting Nom du pére (a) on the other hand he articulates this optics on the 
gaze of the Other through a recourse on Sartre’s thoughts about the gaze in ‘Being 
and Nothingness’ (b). 
a) The Other as ‘lack’: Freud (1976a [1924]) systematically makes it clear in ‘The 
Dissolution of the Œdipus Complex’ that this figure of the Other emerges in par-
ticular as a (prohibitive) limit. Characteristic for this prohibition is, in relation to 
the Œdipus complex, in particular, the threat of castration. The genital interest of 
the boy, which breaks new ground in this phase, is limited by a reference point, 
which prohibits touching oneself. Freud makes this quite clear in his ‘Analysis of 
the Phobia of a Five-Year-Old Boy’ (Freud, 1976b [1909], p. 245), in short: the case 
of 'little Hans': Hans´ interest in widdlers was by no means a purely theoretical 
one; as may have been expected, it also impelled him to touch his member. When 
he was three and a half his mother found him with his hand on his penis." She 
menaced, "If you do that, I shall send for Dr. A. to cut off your widdler. And then 
what'll you widdle with?” Hans, ”With my bottom." However, initially this castra-
tion threat is not taken seriously. But it comes into effect only by the fact that the 
boy becomes aware that the female sex does not have a penis. The 'little Hans' also 
recognizes this in his mother, whom he is one day watching while undressing. She 
asks him what he is doing there and he answers that he is only looking to see 
whether she also has a "Wiwimacher". On the one hand the threat of castration, on 
the other hand, the apparent proof of the execution of a castration. At this point the 
question arises how the castration threat unfolds its radical effect and the relation-
ship to the figure of the father. 
It is Lacan in particular who seems to see much less than a description of an 
"ontogenetic developmental stage" in this figure of the Œdipus complex (Pagel, 
2002, p. 100). Rather for him, a relationship of the foundation of the subject "in a 
effect of the significant" (Lacan 2013, p. 67) is focused by the (necessary) reference 
to the figure of the father. This father figure encompasses what he understands as 
the “big Other” (cf. Lacan, 1997, p. 47). In the Œdipus complex, therefore, Lacan is 
concerned above all else with "the child taking on the phallus as a signifier, in a 
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way that makes him the instrument of the symbolic order of exchange, insofar as it 
precedes the formation of the lines. It is all about being confronted with the order 
that will make "the function of the father the linchpin of the drama" (Lacan 2014, p. 
236). The Œdipus complex and the associated castration threat are not primarily 
related to the presence or absence of any real organ. The metaphor of the father 
which Lacan introduces here, that ‘No of the father’, the "Non du père", which 
simultaneously becomes the "Nom du père" (Lacan, 2013, p. 66; Miller, 2013, p. 8) is 
far more for him. The father is far less something that would incarnate real as a 
prohibiting instance; it is something that is embodied by the agents as a symbolic 
function; it exists only in its inscribing effects on the subjects into the symbolic 
order (cf. Lacan, 2014, p. 428). He is nothing but a metaphor. "It's not the 'real fa-
ther' who spoke out a 'real' ban," as Pagel (2002, p. 101) writes. Rather, that ’non‘ 
refers to the presence of something in the relationship between the individuals 
which it constitutively traverses. The child, here in the form of Hans, is aware of 
"the deep dissatisfaction which the mother feels in the mother-child relationship" 
(Lacan, 2014, p. 238). This "indicates to him that, even if the mother is focused on 
him alone" (ibid., p. 265) the relationship between mother and child is traversed by 
something third. This is what Lacan calls "the law" (ibid., p. 250). This is clearly 
visible in the reaction of Hans´ mother to his self touching. In the threat of the 
mother to get the doctor to cut off the 'Wiwimacher' if necessary, this law is hid-
den, namely the message: 'One ought not do that!' But precisely this form, this 
implicit prohibition, which appears in that situation, marks the way in which the 
law is rendered here. It appears as something preventing the self-pleasure satisfac-
tion by a prohibition. Hans relates in this situation just to that prohibition, to this: 
'one ought not do that!', resonating in the mother’s statement as something ‘third’. 
It becomes quite clear what Lacan understands by what he calls the symbolic. 
He calls this a social context that is basically structured like a language (cf. Lacan, 
2013, p. 27). In order to describe this nexus, Lacan makes use of the relationship of 
signifier and signified, as introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure (see in more detail 
de Saussure 2016, pp. 26sq.). If he asks himself what characterizes this strange act 
of speech between mother and son, Lacan comes across this ‘law’ again. On the one 
hand this kind of speaking is a "speaking to another" – that is, a speaking of the 
mother to a concrete other (the son) and vice versa; on the other hand, it is also a 
speaking to the big Other (Lacan 1997, p. 48). Especially in this situation with the 
mother, the child realizes that in her speech – and the "otherness" articulated with-
in – she is permeated by the Other (ibid.). It becomes clear that this law speaks 
through the mother. And more: The law speaks the mother. She articulates the 
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threat because she has to refer to that 'one' of the 'one ought not do that'. As a 
‘third’ it pervades the relationship of the concrete others to one another. This "one" 
forms the signifier, that sign which establishes the mother's speech as signified. But 
what is the meaning of that 'one'? The mother herself is an educated creature faced 
(and will be faced) with prohibitions. She herself was and will be initiated into the 
symbolic by the prohibiting law. She is situated in a network of reciprocal refe-
rences, for example the ideas of other individuals about how a three-year-old child 
should (normally) behave or how she should behave as a mother, etc. This 'one' 
now speaks through her. In short, she is related to a network of possible attribu-
tions of meaning, to a signifier which signifies her and her speech because she has 
been initiated into this law, into this nexus of the symbolic, immemorially. At the 
same time, however, there is an unbridgeable difference between the signifier, 
which shows that infinite network of reciprocal references in the prohibiting 
speech of the mother, and the signified. This Other in the act of speech between 
mother and son, this law, appears through the ambiguity of the signification pro-
cess. However, neither the mother nor the son becomes fully aware of what this 
'one' in this situation could be specifically called because it relates to a network of 
infinite relationships – of possible fixations of meaning one to another. Thus, here 
arises a situation in which both, the mother and the son, refer to a signifier based 
on their relation to the world, a law which is inaccessible to both, but which per-
meates both in their relationship. 
The boundary between signifier and signified by which the law stands out ap-
pears for Lacan in a specific practice. It is an attempt to be able to express the signi-
fier in the real via the 'system of language' as signified. This fails, however: "The 
system of language [...] never leads to an index finger, which is aimed directly at a 
point in reality, it is the whole reality, which is covered by the totality of the net of 
language" (Lacan, 1997, p. 42), The tier of language always remains overdeter-
mined, as the use of a signifier can have many superimposed meanings. The signi-
fier to which the mother and the son refer in the moment of the pronouncement of 
the prohibition, that ‘third’, loses itself in that web of uninterrupted references. 
Thus Lacan writes: The signifier "always refers to the meaning [...], that is, to an-
other meaning" (p. 42). The attempt to fathom this 'one' ends in a hodgepodge of 
infinite number of possible foundations of this signifier. But these explanations, no 
matter how complex and numerous, could not ultimately determine what could 
qualify this signifier. Thus, the attempt of the mother in the situation with Hans is 
the attempt to utter, what is meaningful, so to say significant for her, in this situa-
tion. However, the attempt to express the signifier in its meaning fails. The mean-
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ing to be expressed in this speech remains nothing, other than the "coming of a 
sense," for "the signifier's reality is that it signifies" (Juranville 1990, p. 105 sq.). 
Thus, in the attempt to signify the signifier, nothing remains but the experience of 
the failure of this signification. In a nutshell this seems to describe how Lacan un-
derstands the castration complex: The prohibiting (big) Other remains nothing but 
an imagination, which shows itself in the failure of the significations. 
Thus, the toy in the introductory example, Huizinga has given just seems to 
mark such a failure of the signification. The carriages in the boy's game are not real 
carriages, they are chairs; but these chairs are carriages for him within his game 
simultaneously. They are both – carriages and chairs or neither carriages nor 
chairs. They signify a boundary, a failure of the articulations, which, however, 
constitutes a matrix, from which that gaze, which was delineated before, spreads. 
At the same time, however, this is also a matrix that has inscribed itself into the 
subject as the failure of every articulation of language as the difference between the 
signifier and the signified. And so, inevitably, that (big) Other also appears in those 
statements regarding the carriages of the playing boy, as an unavailable ‘third’, 
permeating every form of playing practice. But in this example we could also see 
the second form of the appearance of the gaze of the Other as 'lack'. 
b) …the beheld gaze of the Other: This articulation of such an unavailable third 
connects to the practice of the gaze and inscribes itself into the subject. This is 
made clear by Lacan's recourse to Sartre's chapter on the look in his ‘Being and 
Nothingness’. This gaze of the Other is illustrated by Sartre in some impressive 
examples, which allow us to resume the line we have already pursued: that of the 
gaze of the Other as a redoubled gaze. For Sartre, the Other is something that 
emerges in the field of the subjects perception. He gives the example of an observa-
tion of another person in a public park. The subject sees the observed person as an 
object, but at the same time as a subject. As an object, its position can be described 
spatiotemporally: It is located 2.20 m from the lawn of the park and passes through 
a group of chairs; it can be described how big it is, etc. However, if we consider this 
object as a subject, then the problem arises that this subject has a relation to the 
things around him, which is completely revoked from the position of the observing 
subject. The other subject may also perceive the lawn, which is 2.20 m away from 
it. But it perceives the lawn from its subjective relation to it (cf. Sartre, 1994, p. 459).  
Here the "Other is" for Sartre the "permanent flight of things" (p. 461): The ob-
jects of the world are thus to be thought of exclusively as subjectively perceived. 
But as subjectively perceived objects, they can simultaneously be subjects, who in 
turn perceive the world from their perspective, which eludes an outside observer. 
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In the same way he/she is bound in his/her appearance to his/her objectivity (cf. p. 
462). So in the observation in the park, just another person can sit and read on a 
bench. This person reading is just as subject as a stone lying or the rain falling. At 
the same time, however, this example of the reading person points out that the 
simultaneity of the objectivity and subjectivity articulates the Other: The person 
reading is on the one hand an object for an external observer; similarly this person 
reading is relating to the book in her/his hand and constitutes a subjective world in 
this relation, which eludes every kind of external access. The Other thus appears 
precisely as the absence of the world (relation of the reading subject to her/his 
world) in the relation to his/her own world (p. 463), or as Sartre would put it: the 
absence of the world in the Being-for-itself (cf. p. 163sq.). Insofar as that subjecti-
vity of the concrete (reading) other is associated with its objectivity, then conver-
sely this simultaneity of objectivity and subjectivity must also apply to the obser-
ving subject from the perspective of another subject, which observes the observing 
subject during its observation. Sartre says: 
At most we are dealing with a particular type of objectivity akin to that which Husserl 
designated by the term absence without, however, his noting that the Other is defined 
not as the absence of a consciousness in relation to the body which I see but by the ab-
sence of the world which I perceive, an absence discovered at the very heart of my 
perception of this world. On this level the Other is an object in the world, an object 
which can be defined by the world. […] if the Other-as-object is defined in connection 
with the world, as the object which sees what I see, then my fundamental connection 
with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility 
of being seen by the Other. It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for 
the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. (Sartre, 
1994, p. 463) 
It is precisely this possibility of "being-seen-by-another" (Sartre, 1994, p. 464), 
which has an effect on the observing subject. But this possibility is not bound up 
with the (physical) appearance of a sensuous form in the perceptual field of the 
observing subject (cf. p. 465): "But the look will be given just as well on occasion 
when there is a rustling of branches, or the sound of a footstep followed by silence, 
or the slight opening of a shutter, or a light movement of a curtain" (p. 465). And 
from that point on, Sartre is just coming to the set of issues which is eliciting La-
cans reflections on the gaze of the Other as "redoubled gaze" and its separation of 
eye and gaze. Sartre writes: "On the contrary, far from perceiving the look on the 
objects which manifest it, my apprehension of a look turned toward me appears on 
the ground of the destruction of the eyes which look at me" (p. 466). What appears 
in this gaze of the Other is not the look of a concrete other, but the subjective ap-
prehension of a gaze, which sees the observing subject as the observer. The gaze of 
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the Other "is to be conscious of being looked at", it "is a pure reference to myself". 
(p. 467). 
For Sartre, however, this gaze is a practice which first generates that self-
consciousness. He describes this in his famous keyhole example. Sartre imagines 
the following situation:  
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice, I have just glued my ear to 
the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone and on the level of a non-thetic self-
consciousness. This means first of all that there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, 
nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no 
way known; I am my acts and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification." 
(Sartre, 1994, p. 467).  
This self-consciousness of the subject articulates only where the Other appears 
as something that does not even have to be present. The Other emerges already 
only when the subject "hear[s] footsteps in the hall" (Sartre, 1994, p. 469). The Other 
appears as someone/something in whose gaze the subject looking through the key-
hole becomes the object of a gaze itself. Only in this objectification by the Other the 
now observed subject gains self-consciousness. The Other is here assumed as an-
other consciousness, which is able to objectify the subject (which is looking 
through the keyhole). We could imagine this Other coming up here as something 
that gives an identity to the subject which is looking through the keyhole. In its 
judging gaze we could assume that the Other articulates the subject as a voyeur 
perhaps. The gaze of the Other gives the subject an identity that simultaneously 
and fundamentally misjudges the identity of the subject. Ricken sums it up: "In the 
gaze of the Other I am learning myself not only as a certain someone, i.e. as some-
one who is located in a social order and for example, who is identified and classi-
fied as lazy or hard-working, clever or stupid, etc. The way in which I refer to my-
self can not be separated from the way in which I am referred" (Ricken 2016, p. 49). 
The self becomes aware of itself only when it sees the gaze of the Other and thus 
comes into a relation to itself. Sartre writes: "This means that all of a sudden I am 
conscious of myself as escaping myself, not in that I am the foundation of my own 
nothingness but in that I have my foundation outside myself. I am for myself only 
as I am a pure reference to the Other" (Sartre 1994, p. 470). Something similar, 
however, seems to be also to be found on that example of the engine playing boy. 
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3.	The	gaze,	the	game	and	the	subject 
Two assertions we made at the beginning of the text; both seem related. Firstly 
we asserted that the specific subjective attitude, in which the game is played, arti-
culates the imaginary as real. In this context we have been concerned with the 
phenomenon of play and in particular with Huizingas 'holy earnest'. He tries to 
illustrate this with the example of a boy playing an engine. For the boy, chairs be-
come something real in the imaginary space of the game. They are for him the car-
riages of a train. At the same time, however, the father, who hugs the boy, is rejec-
ted as saying: "Don't kiss the engine, Daddy, or the carriages won't think it's real" 
(Huizinga 1980, p. 8). As has been pointed out below, it is that being-seen by the 
Other in the game, that produces the significant entanglement of the subject in the 
space of play and thus the realization of the imaginary. Decisive here, however, is 
that this being-seen-by-the-Other is seen by the player. It is the consciousness that 
it is just a game that ultimately leads to the player's irreflexive entanglement. 
This led to the second assertion: The realization of the imaginary in the subjec-
tive mode of 'holy earnest' is to be seen in close proximity to Lacan's perspective on 
the constitution of modern subjectivity. We tried to clarify this with a closer look 
on the gaze of the Other. At that point, we have pointed out two modes of articula-
tion of the Other which appear in Lacan’s works: On the one hand there is a gaze 
of the Other, which stares at the subject on the other hand there is the gaze of the 
Other, which could be described in more detail as a 'redoubled gaze'. As a 'lack', 
this Other is looking at us when we see this lack. In this regard, we tried to ap-
proach this gaze of the Other as a 'lack' of two sides: On the one hand Lacan’s per-
spective on the Other as a 'lack' inscribes into the subject as a constitutive diffe-
rence articulated by the symbolic law. On the other hand, this was depicted with 
Sartre; we tried to point out this gaze of the Other as a precondition of the Laca-
nian perspective. The gaze of the Other makes us subjects, only in the form of an 
objectification. We perceive ourselves, so to say, in the objectifying gaze of the 
Other only as subjects, because we can not be identical to the objectification of the 
Other. 
This has consequences. First, inasmuch as this connection between the realiza-
tion of the imaginary, in the play, and the constitution of the subject from the per-
spective of Lacan is plausible, we could state that subjects are always objects at the 
same time. They are – as Fink puts it in terms on the regards of the toys – "inter-
mediate things" (Fink, 2010a, p. 22). If we follow Fink, then the game – and the toys 
used therein – are a symbolization of the world, because it refers to a specific con-
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stitutional logic. The toy is for him a "representation of all things in general" (p. 22). 
The whole of the world seems to be "concentrated" in the toy as one "single thing" 
(p. 22). Toys seem to negotiate constitutive points of social order.5 However, maybe 
the game and its objects seem to become a specific sedimentation of the social and 
– we could note as a thesis now – even the negotiation of modern subjectivity is 
represented in the game. The subject is also an intermediate thing, which consti-
tutes itself by transforming the imaginary into reality by taking serious the non-
serious. However, this also implies, secondly, if we take Sartre’s persective on the 
gaze on the Other and the subject seriously, then subjectivation and objectification 
are reciprocally referenced (cf. Ricken 2016, p. 49). Perhaps the game and the toys 
thus offer a matrix with which the constitution of modern subjectivity can be given 
further thought especially if we factor such a perspective to optics on subjectifi-
cation, which is how Foucault (1983, 1994a, 1994b) or Butler (1997) articulate them. 
To what extent do social spaces or even communities constitute themselves in this 
mode of realizing the imaginary? In what context is the phenomenon of play the 
concept of virtuality? And especially: how can it be described that actions in ima-
ginary spaces can have effects on the seriousness of ordinary life? All this ques-
tions remain open. 
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